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Abstract
Background: Cooperation is ubiquitous in biological systems, yet its evolution is a long lasting evolutionary
problem. A general and intuitive result from theoretical models of cooperative behaviour is that cooperation
decreases when its costs are higher, because selfish individuals gain selective advantage.
Results: Contrary to this intuition, we show that cooperation can increase with higher costs. We analyse a minimal
model where individuals live on a lattice and evolve the degree of cooperation. We find that a feedback establishes
between the evolutionary dynamics of public good production and the spatial self-organisation of the population.
The evolutionary dynamics lead to the speciation of a cooperative and a selfish lineage. The ensuing spatial
self-organisation automatically diversifies the selection pressure on the two lineages. This enables selfish individuals to
successfully invade cooperators at the expenses of their autonomous replication, and cooperators to increase public
good production while expanding in the empty space left behind by cheaters. We show that this emergent feedback
leads to higher degrees of cooperation when costs are higher.
Conclusions: An emergent feedback between evolution and self-organisation leads to high degrees of cooperation
at high costs, under simple and general conditions. We propose this as a general explanation for the evolution of
cooperative behaviours under seemingly prohibitive conditions.
Keywords: Evolution of cooperation, Spatial model, Viscous populations, Travelling waves, Multi-level evolution
Background
When cooperation is costly to the individual but its ben-
efits are equally shared in a group, one would expect
progressively more selfish behaviour to be selected. This
indeed happens when interactions between cooperative
and selfish individuals are random. Instead, cooperation
can be selected in a population when the interactions
among cooperative and selfish individuals are structured,
be it genetically, spatially or socially [1–6]. Population
structure favours cooperation when it allows for coopera-
tors to be in contact with each other more frequently than
with selfish individuals [7].
The result is a (locally or globally) stable equilibrium
configuration in which cooperators persist indefinitely,
and selfish individuals may co-exist. For instance, this can
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be due to spatial clustering of cooperators [8], or to an
inherent structure of the interaction network [9]. Then,
the conditions for selfish individuals invading and over-
taking a group of cooperators represent the limit to the
stability of the solutions found. In general, these condi-
tions state that higher costs of cooperation increase the
selective advantage of selfish individuals.
While spatial structure alone can favour cooperators
due to population viscosity, a growing body of experi-
mental and theoretical work indicates that self-organised
spatial patterns may have profound and complex
effects on cooperative interactions, due to emergent
heterogeneities in the local distributions and densi-
ties of cooperators and selfish individuals [10–19]. For
instance, as a population of cooperators invade empty
space, its expansion front can be enriched in altru-
istic individuals, while selfish individuals lag behind
[13, 15, 18]. Alternatively, mutualistic interactions that
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are favoured in a resident population can be automati-
cally broken on such expansion front [14]. Furthermore,
spatial self-organisation can sort cooperative strains from
selfish ones [12, 20–24], thus limiting the spread of the
latter.
The customary approach to study the stability of coop-
eration (under a specific set of assumptions) consists of
fixing the strategies of the interacting cooperative and
selfish individuals, and analyse the population dynam-
ics of the system (e.g. whether cooperators and defectors
coexist, or if one lineage outcompetes the other). Because
such pre-determined strategies do not mutate over time,
their evolutionary stability remains unexplored.
Although exceptions to this approach exist (e.g.
[8, 22, 25, 26]), little is known about what strategies evolve
(by mutation and selection) and how they feedback on
the spatial self-organisation of a population, even though
it is clear that spatial self-organisation affects the popula-
tion dynamics of cooperative traits (see examples above).
Here, we seek to study this feed-back between evolution
and self-organisation with a minimal model where indi-
viduals can evolve the degree of cooperation in a spatially
extended system.
We model the cooperative trait in terms of pub-
lic good production (inspired by social dynamics in
microbes [27, 28]), and we let the amount of public
good produced mutate in a continuous fashion. Thus,
we can study the long term evolutionary dynamics of
cooperation without preconceiving the extent to which
individuals cooperate or defect. As we will show, self-
ish individuals that produce zero public good evolve
readily at higher costs, and quickly invade cooper-
ators. Rather than leading to global extinction, this
enables cooperators to thrive and selects for a higher
degree of public good production over evolutionary time
scales.
Results
The model is a straightforward implementation of a pop-
ulation in which individuals replicate depending on the
amount of public good produced in their close neighbour-
hood.
Individuals are embedded on a lattice. They may repro-
duce, die or move (locally). Competition for reproduction
into neighbouring empty nodes is based on fitness, calcu-
lated as the difference between benefits and costs (Fig. 1).
An individual benefits from the public good produced
in its neighbourhood, but pays a cost for producing it.
Thus, public good production is a cooperative trait. We
assume that reproductive success is solely based on coop-
eration, so that individuals do not reproduce if public good
in their neighbourhood is insufficient. Mutations slightly
change the offspring’s production rate (see Methods for
details).
High cost leads to the evolution of larger public good
production
We set the benefits per unit of public good b = 10, and
we let the spatial self-organisation and the evolutionary
dynamics unfold under different costs c.
When costs are much smaller than benefits (c ≤ 1.5,
Fig. 2), the public good production steadily increases
because an individuals’ own production increases its fit-
ness, rather than decreasing it. Moreover, because repli-
cation is a local process, mutants with higher than average
production rates benefit from each other due to limited
dispersal [7–9], outcompetingmore selfish lineages. Thus,
cooperation is maximised in the long run. For increasing
costs, public good production suddenly drops (2 ≤ c ≤ 3,
Fig. 2). In this regime, the clustering advantage of cooper-
ators is insufficient and more selfish individuals replicate
the most because, by producing less, they pay a lower
cost. Eventually, public good production stabilises at the
minimum value needed for survival.
Strikingly, further increasing costs leads to an increase
in cooperation (c > 3, Fig. 2, see Additional file 1: Section 1
for the full snapshots of the system). The distribution of
public good production is bimodal at evolutionary steady
state, with most of the population having higher rates of
public good production and a minority producing almost
no public good at all.
The long term evolutionary dynamics of cooperation at
high cost
Following the evolutionary and the spatial dynamics of a
single case elucidates why cooperation increases and per-
sists for higher costs (c = 4.5, Fig. 3, video at [29]). When
we initialise the system with highly producing individuals,
public good production decreases rapidly due to strong
selection for selfishness (compare Fig. 3b and c). Where
public good production drops below the minimum for
survival, large patches of individuals go extinct (Fig. 3b).
The surviving individuals can expand into the empty
space (Fig. 3c). As the expansion progresses, a selfish and
cooperative lineage separate from each other (Fig. 3d).
The selfish strain evolves to zero public good produc-
tion, becoming incapable of autonomous persistence and
relying on the public good produced by cooperators for
survival.
While the two strains differentiate from each other,
they organise spatially to form travelling waves (Fig. 3e
and 3f, similar to [23, 24]). Cooperators constitute the
front of a wave, and expand into empty space by repli-
cating into it (generation after generation); selfish indi-
viduals invade those cooperators, and constitute the
back of the wave. Selfish individuals leave empty space
behind a wave after they die, causing the semblance of
movement (See Fig. 4 and [29] for videos). The pro-
gression of a wave, however, happens on a time scale
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Fig. 1 The model. a The world is a square lattice with connectivity k = 8 (every node has 8 neighbours) and wrapped boundary conditions.
Individuals produce public good at rate p, shared in equal parts (p/9) among all neighbouring nodes and self. b Individuals compete for
reproduction into an adjacent empty spot. Probability of reproduction depends on fitness fi , which is the difference between benefits and costs. The
sum of the public good an individual collects from itself and the neighbours, if any, is psum = (pa + pb + . . . + pi)/9, and confers a benefit b · psum.
Individuals pay a fitness cost proportional to the public good they produce: c · p. Successful reproduction yields a copy of the selected individual.
Mutations occur with probability μ and change the public good production rate by a small random number chosen uniformly in the interval
[−δ/2, δ/2]. Individuals have a small probability kmove to move to a random adjacent node, and can die with probability kdeath, leaving the node
empty (See Methods for the details of the models)
Fig. 2 An increase in costs results in an evolutionary increase in cooperation. a Evolutionary steady state distribution (in blue) and mean (red
diamond) of public good production are plotted for different values of costs (benefits are kept constant). Parameters: benefit (per unit of public good
produced) b = 10, kdeath = 0.2, kmove = 0.02, μ = 0.05, δ = 0.1. The maximum public good production is set to pmax = 10. b Snapshots of the
lattice at evolutionary steady state. Colour coding depends on public good production rate. White is background. Lattice dimensions used for the
simulations from left to right: 2562, 5122, 20482, 20482 (1/16 of the lattice is displayed for clarity, see Additional file 1: Section 1 for the full snapshots)
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Fig. 3 Evolutionary dynamics of public good production. a At each time point the distribution of public good production in the lattice is plotted as
a heat map. b-g Snapshots of the lattice at subsequent time steps (letters correspond between time plot and snapshots). Costs (per unit of public
good) c = 4.5, other parameters and colour coding in the snapshot as in Fig. 2. Lattice size = 20482 (1/16 of the lattice is displayed for clarity). Time
units are Monte Carlo steps. See also Additional file 1: Section 2 for the full snapshots, and movie at [29]
that is much longer than the life time of an individual,
which in turn experiences a fairly constant environment
throughout its life. Because waves persist longer than
individuals, they can integrate information over several
generations.
Newwaves are “born” from the collisions of older waves.
As cooperators on the front evolve to larger public good
production, waves become larger (compare Fig. 3e, f and
g, and Additional file 1: Section 2 for the full snapshots).
The formation of spatial patterns allows the populations in
the system to persist indefinitely despite selfish individuals
continuously invading cooperators (Fig. 3g and Additional
file 1: Section 6), provided that the lattice is much larger
than the spatial patterns (see Additional file 1: Section 3).
Fig. 4 The movement of a travelling wave. Magnification (200 x 100) of the same portion of the lattice at 10 time steps distance. a the wave-front,
composed of cooperative individuals (in green), b the back, composed of selfish individuals (in blue). The snapshots are from the same simulation
run as in Fig. 3, at time steps 400,000 (left) and 400,010 (right). The dashed line in the right pane marks approximately the position of the wave in the
left pane. Colizzi and Hogeweg [29] shows one such travelling wave in a video
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Spatial population dynamics of cooperators and selfish
individuals
Spatial self-organisation drives the evolution of coopera-
tion in the system. When spatial patterns are destroyed,
e.g. by mixing, only selfish individuals are selected and
public good production decreases, leading to global
extinction (Additional file 1: Section 4), in accordance
with the result that random interactions favour selfish
behaviour.
To unravel the interplay between the two lineages and
their spatial organisation, we analysed the spatial popula-
tion dynamics for cooperative and selfish individuals sepa-
rately. To this end, we shaped the lattice into a long, narrow
strip, and set the mutation rate to zero (see Material
and Methods for details). Cooperators expand faster into
empty space when they produce more public good, and
slower when costs are higher (Fig 5a, red). When two clus-
tered populations compete at the expansion front (Fig 5c),
the one with the largest public good production wins
because, by replicating faster, it occupies space before the
competing one and eventually overtakes the entire wave
front.
The replication rate of selfish individuals invad-
ing a population of cooperators is higher when the
cost of public good production is higher, and it is
insensitive to how much public good is produced
(Fig 5a, blue). Clearly, when two strains compete in the
back of a wave, the winner is the more selfish one
(Fig 5b).
The picture emerging from these experiments is that
different selection pressures operate depending on the
spatial context: a population expanding into empty space
(the wave front) is selected for higher degrees of coop-
eration (in agreement with [12, 13, 15, 18]), competition
in the back (behind the wave front) selects for more
selfishness. Importantly, even though costs, benefits and
fitness function are the same, spatial pattern formation
automatically segregates these two opposing evolutionary
pressures to spatially different contexts so that they do not
balance each other: hence the evolution of a cooperative
and a selfish lineage.
In the full system, cooperators and selfish individ-
uals are ecologically and evolutionarily interdependent
(Additional file 1: Section 5). The two lineages establish
an evolutionary feedback mediated by their spatial organ-
isation. Empty space is generated by selfish individuals
after invading a population of cooperators. Therefore, the
condition for increasing public good production, i.e. the
availability of continuous empty space, is mediated by
the invasion dynamics of the selfish lineage. With higher
costs, selfish individuals propagate faster, and space is
left empty at a higher rate. The larger the empty space,
the more cooperators can increase public good produc-
tion. This evolutionary feedback reaches an evolutionary
steady state because highly producing cooperators reduce
the empty space faster upon faster expansions (Fig 5a).
We checked the long term stability of the steady state
(Additional file 1: Section 6).
Fig. 5 Invasion rates and spatial dynamics of competition for cooperative and selfish individuals. a Cooperators’ invasion rate increases with larger
public good production and lower costs; selfish invasion rate increases with increasing costs and it is insensitive to the production rates of the
cooperators that support them. The invasion rates for cooperators invading empty space (red circles) and selfish individuals invading a population
of cooperators (blue circles) was measured for each combination of cost and public good production rate (benefit is constant, and set to b = 10) in
10. b A population with lower public good production rate out-competes one with larger production in the back of a wave. Parameters:
cooperators (yellow wave-front) pyellow = 6.0, selfish individuals (magenta and blue wave-back) pblue = 0.2 and pmagenta = 1.0. c The population
with a larger production rate out-competes the one with lower production at the front of a wave. Parameters: ppurple = 5.0, pgreen = 6.0. For both
a and b, μ = 0, b = 10, c = 4.0, background in white. Other parameters as in Fig. 2
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Altogether, cooperation evolves to a higher degree for
higher costs due to an emergent feedback between self-
organised interaction structures (the spatial patterns) and
the evolution of the individuals composing them.
Robustness to parameter change
Our results are robust when death rates, movement rates
and benefits are changed, provided that benefits-to-costs
ratio is maintained (Additional file 1: Section 7). At lower
costs, individuals directly benefiting themselves with their
own public good are sometimes dubbed weak altruists
[7, 30] (in our case, for c < b/(k + 1), with k +
1 = 9 the connectivity of the lattice including self ),
whereas they are considered strong altruists when their
public good is only shared among others (in the con-
text of game theory, these situations are called, respec-
tively, snowdrift game and prisoner’s dilemma [25]). In
our spatial model, we observed no qualitative difference
in the evolutionary dynamics when individuals did or
did not benefit from their own public good (Additional
file 1: Section 8). This could be expected because indi-
viduals’ own payoffs at high costs are negative in both
models. Indeed, in both cases the evolving populations
underwent speciation of a selfish and a cooperative
lineage.
Weak or strong altruism do make a difference in the
corresponding well-mixed systems, where strong altruists
go extinct at lower costs, while weak altruists maximise
public good production (Additional file 1: Section 9).
Discussion
It is known that during population range expansion,
cooperation can be promoted on the front of the
expansion range [12, 13, 15, 18]. One could argue
that in these models cooperation could evolve only
as long as empty space is available, and should even-
tually be out-competed globally by selfish strategies
when the invasion dynamics reach an end. Here we
have shown that selfish individuals provide the empty
space to allow continuous expansion within a limited
area.
Generally, stable solutions to the problem of coopera-
tion are based on the condition that at equilibrium selfish
individuals do not locally invade a population of cooper-
ators. For instance, it is well known that cooperation can
be stabilised in spatially extended systems, as coopera-
tors cluster and segregate selfish individuals to the edges
of those clusters [8, 19, 31]. A side effect of these solu-
tions is that higher costs undermines the stability of such
clusters. In the parameter region where travelling waves
do not form (Fig. 2, for c ≤ 3) our work is in agreement
with those results in that there exists an inverse relation-
ship between costs and cooperation (e.g. [1, 2, 6]), and in
particular with the heuristics [9] that cooperation evolves
when the benefit-to-cost ratio is larger than the connectiv-
ity of the lattice (b/c > k, while it becomes progressively
more unlikely when b/c approaches k).
However, we have shown that a novel class of solu-
tions exists at high costs, where large degrees of coop-
eration are maintained in a locally out-of-equilibrium
fashion, with selfish individuals always successfully invad-
ing cooperators and setting the stage for the evolution-
ary increase and the global stability of cooperation. We
conclude that spatial self-organisation can reverse the
relationship between costs and cooperation, thus extend-
ing the evolutionary viability of cooperation to higher
costs.
Our results rest on two assumptions: population size
can vary and some degree of cooperation is necessary
for reproduction. Variable population size is obviously
realistic, even though it is not often included in evolu-
tionary models of cooperation. Although the assumption
of necessary cooperation is not always met, it is reason-
able in several cases. Examples in microbiology include,
cooperative protection or cooperative virulence in bac-
terial infections [32, 33]; invertase production in yeasts
while growing on sucrose [34]; siderophore production
in iron-limited environments [35–37], cooperative secre-
tion of digestive enzyme in microbial hunting [27, 38].
Outside the microbial world, situations where our model
may apply are e.g. dangerous behaviours in cooperative
nest defence [39], and replication in trans in prebiotic
evolution [40, 41].
Two recent studies have come to conclusions that at
first sight are similar to ours [17, 19]. By making the
assumption, as we do, that the lack of cooperation leads to
death, they observe (quasi) static spatial patterns in which
cooperation is maintained because despite relatively high
costs, clusters of cooperators cannot be invaded by selfish
individuals.
In contrast, cheaters can always invade in our system,
and do so faster when costs are higher. This shows that
costs are qualitatively higher in our model. Cooperation
is maintained despite, and due to the evolution of true
cheaters (in the sense of [42]). Furthermore, we show that
the amount of public good produced by an individual
increases in evolutionary times, whereas the evolution-
ary stability of the solutions in [17, 19] is left unexplored,
and only the long population dynamical transient is
analysed.
More in general, the importance of spatial self-
organisation for understanding the population dynamics
of cooperators and defectors has been highlighted both
from a theoretical [10] and from an experimental point
of view [43]. Here we make a similar point, but with an
evolutionary twist: in our case selfish individuals are not
merely a burden to cooperators; instead, their emergence
as a separate lineage is necessary for the evolution of high
Colizzi and Hogeweg BMC Evolutionary Biology  (2016) 16:31 Page 7 of 8
degrees of public good production because they generate
the spatial conditions in which cooperators thrive and
evolve.
Allowing mutations to change public good production
in a continuous range resulted in the evolution of
two separate strains, a selfish and a cooperative one.
The evolution of stable heterogeneity in a popula-
tion has been observed before in models of coop-
eration [22, 25, 44]. Here, besides stressing that the
evolution of two lineages from a single ancestral one
might be a rather general feature of models with vari-
able investments (as very simple assumptions were
needed, in contrast to [25]), we make the case that
true cheating behaviour (sensu [42]) is actually func-
tional and beneficial to the long term evolution of
cooperation.
Conclusions
In conclusion, besides extending the theoretical limits
of cooperation, our results broaden the search image of
cooperative behaviour in nature by suggesting that there
need not be a strict trade-off between costs and benefits;
rather, a wider view of the self-organised eco-evolutionary
processes must be taken into account to understand the
occurrence of costly cooperation.
Methods
General system
Our system is an individual-based, Monte Carlo simu-
lation run on a square lattice with connectivity k = 8
and toroidal boundary conditions. The nodes of the lat-
tice can be empty or occupied by at most one individual.
Individuals produce public good with rate p per time step
(alternatively, p can be considered the degree of altruism
of an individual). An individual i produces pi public good
per time step (0 ≤ pi ≤ 10), which is divided equally
among neighbouring nodes and self, each receiving pi/9
public good. All n neighbours, in turn, share a fraction of
the public good they produce p{1,2,...,n}/9 with individual
i. The benefit from the public good received from each









is the benefit per unit of public good. Individuals pay a cost
proportional to the public good they produce Ci = cpi.
Public good is not accumulated over multiple time steps.
The fitness of an individual is the difference between ben-
efits and costs: fi = Bi − Ci (set to zero if costs exceed
benefits).
Each Monte Carlo step, all nodes are updated in ran-
dom order (although synchronous updating rules do not
affect results). If a node is empty, the individuals in its
neighbourhood (if any) compete for replication. Assume
an individual i is competing withm other individuals, and
let us name ftot the sum of the fitness of all individuals




Individual i is chosen for reproduction over its competi-
tors with probability P(i replicates) = fiftot
(
1 − e−ftot).
The term in parenthesis is the probability that at least an
individual replicates, which models the assumption repli-
cation should bemore frequent in a neighbourhood where
there is more public good, and conversely it should be rare
if little public good is produced. Notice that this term does
not affect death.
Upon successful replication, mutations may happen
with probability μ and affect p by adding a small random
number drawn with uniform probability from the inter-
val [−δ/2, δ/2]. If a node is not empty, with probability
kmove its content is swapped with that of a randomly cho-
sen adjacent node. Moreover, every non empty node can
turn to empty with probability kdeath. See Fig. 1 for a car-
toon of the model and the caption of Fig. 2 for the actual
values of the parameters. The algorithm is implemented
using the CASH libraries [45].
Invasion dynamics of cooperators and selfish individuals
(Fig. 5)
We modified the system described above as follows: 1)
we shaped the lattice into a narrow strip of arbitrary
length; 2) we changed the boundary conditions to no-
flux, and in particular we removed individuals when they
moved or replicated into a boundary node of the lattice;
3) we set mutation rates to zero to better focus on spa-
tial population dynamics. The rules for the local dynamics
remained the same as above.We initialised all populations
on one side of the lattice and waited until they reached the
other side. For cooperators this meant that they invaded
empty space, whereas selfish individuals invaded a resi-
dent homogeneous population of cooperators. In all cases,
the number of Monte Carlo time steps it took for the first
individuals to arrive to the other side of the lattice (gen-
eration by generation) was recorded. The invasion rate
plotted in Fig. 5 was calculated as the length of the space
invaded divided by the time it took for the population to
invade it.
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